GLOBAL EXPERIENCE OF COUNTING THE IMPACT OF HYBRID WARFARE ON NATIONAL AND ENERGY SECURITY AND ITS OBJECTS

Authors

  • Alina Alina Doctor of Sciences in Public Administration, Senior Researcher, Head of the Scientific Department for State Security Problems of Research Centre of the National University of Civil Protection of Ukraine https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5666-9350
  • Dmytro Taraduda PhD in Technical Science, Associate professor, Deputy Head of Department of Organization and Technical Support of Emergency Rescue Works, National University of Civil Protection of Ukraine https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9167-0058

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.31470/2786-6246-2024-9-142-150

Keywords:

public administration, public policy, national security, energy security, social security, hybrid warfare, critical infrastructure, objects of increased danger, cyber attacks, NATO

Abstract

It was revealed that the characteristics of the components of national security give reasons to insist on the importance of implementing a set of measures aimed at maintaining an adequate level of energy and social security functioning in the conditions of a hybrid war. This war has a negative impact on all countries of the world, including in Ukraine. It was revealed that due to the significant development of information and communication technologies and the growing dependence on them, a new sphere of confrontation has appeared, one of whose opponents is the Russian Federation, whose influence has a detrimental effect on the political and military functions of NATO in general and Ukraine in particular. It was found that the destructive influence of the Russian Federation on the energy sphere of Ukraine and NATO member states is manifested not only starting from 2022, its obvious consequences can be found as early as 2009 during the operation of energy infrastructure facilities in Germany and other countries. In addition, one can find an indirect Russian trace of influence on the energy security of various countries of the world (in particular, through Iran). It is emphasized that the ubiquity of digital connectivity, the ability to deny involvement in attacks, and the benefits of disrupting critical energy infrastructure through network-dependent operations have become a driving force in the evolution of Russian hybrid warfare. The situation in Ukraine is even more complicated by massive attacks by the aggressor state on domestic critical infrastructure facilities. This is done, including with the aim of destabilizing the development of Ukrainian society, increasing discontent, apathy, aggression, conflicts, etc. among it. On this basis, he insists on the dual role of domestic state bodies in opposing the undeclared war of the Russian Federation. International technical assistance, in particular NATO, can help in this. It is argued that NATO is in a unique position that allows the Alliance to strengthen the work of member states to address vulnerabilities and to generalize lessons learned in this area. It has been established that the Alliance faces the task of reaching the appropriate level of operational cooperation in order to deter potentially destructive hybrid attacks by the Russian Federation on the energy infrastructure and its recovery after them.

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Published

2024-10-10

How to Cite

Alina А., & Taraduda Д. (2024). GLOBAL EXPERIENCE OF COUNTING THE IMPACT OF HYBRID WARFARE ON NATIONAL AND ENERGY SECURITY AND ITS OBJECTS. Public Administration: Concepts, Paradigm, Development, Improvement, (9), 142–150. https://doi.org/10.31470/2786-6246-2024-9-142-150